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• I. Revising the Lisbon Strategy: 
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• II. Where’s the evidence? 
The OMC in action
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– Closing the implementation gap through better 
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– Reorienting the relaunch? Towards Lisbon III3
I. Revising the Lisbon Strategy: 
What Was at Stake?
• Ambiguities of the original Lisbon Agenda: 
something for everyone
– Competitiveness: liberalization and structural reform
– Innovation: a dynamic knowledge-based economy
– Sustainable economic growth
– Full employment: more and better jobs
– Greater social cohesion: fight against poverty/social 
exclusion, modernization of the European Social Model
– Environmental sustainability
• added in 2001 under the Swedish presidency4
Lisbon’s contested legacy
• Rival interpretations of the Lisbon Strategy
– One focused on competitiveness and innovation
• ‘Making the EU the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010’
– Another focused on new balance between social and 
economic dimensions of European integration
• ‘socio-economic policy triangle’: equal weight for full 
employment and social cohesion alongside 
growth/competitiveness/fiscal stability as EU objectives5
Lisbon’s contested legacy (2)
• Ongoing struggle for control of EU policy 
coordination between economic and social actors
– ECFIN/Ecofin/EPC vs. EMPL/EPSCO/EMCO-SPC
• Ongoing critique by ‘competitiveness lobby’ of 
slow progress towards economic liberalization
– DGs Internal Market/Enterprise, business groups, think 
tanks, financial press
• Changing political composition of the Council
– Election of new center-right governments, 2001-4 6
OMC as a new governance 
instrument for Lisbon Strategy
• Reconciling pursuit of European objectives with respect 
for national diversity & subsidiarity through iterative 
benchmarking of progress against common indicators
• Promoting mutual emulation and cross-national learning 
by comparison of different approaches to shared problems
• A ‘third way’ for EU governance between 
harmonization/centralization and regulatory 
competition/fragmentation
• Never intended as sole governance instrument for Lisbon
– to be combined with other EU policy tools (legislation, social 
dialogue, structural funds, community action programs, etc.)7
Ambiguities of OMC
• Recipe, cookbook, or architecture?
– Multiplication of procedural variations 
– ‘Lite’ recipes/missing elements in many newer OMCs
• Convergence of what?
– Performance or policies?
• Open in what sense?
– Role of EU recommendations?
– Participation by non-state/subnational actors?
• A tool for building Social Europe or for avoiding 
new EU social legislation?8
Critique and contestation
• OMC as a potential threat to Community Method
• OMC as an infringement of subsidiarity
– Intrusion of EU into reserved competences of MS
• Convention stalemate over constitutionalization
• Struggle over review/reform of EES (2002-4)
– Simplified guidelines/quantitative targets
– Participation of non-state/subnational actors
– Commission or MS as agenda setter for national 
reform? (Kok Employment Task Force)9
OMC and Lisbon Strategy review
• OMC doubly called into question by 2004-5 
Lisbon Strategy review
• Horizontally 
– Balance and integration between distinct policy 
coordination processes/objectives
• Vertically: 
– Effectiveness in securing Member State 
progress towards common European objectives10
Kok Report (2004)
• Criticized OMC for weakness of incentives for 
MS policy delivery
• But also noted ineffectiveness of Community 
Method in ensuring implementation of directives 
• Called for refocusing of objectives and targets on 
growth and employment
• To be supported by intensified peer pressure on 
MS (naming, shaming, faming/league tables)11
Barroso Commission
(Lisbon New Start 2005)
• Criticized OMC for failing to mobilize MS 
commitment to implementation of strategy
• Rejected naming & shaming approach
• Called for new reform partnerships between 
Commission and MS, and between national 
governments and domestic stakeholders
• From sectoral, multilateral policy coordination 
(OMC) to integrated, bilateral dialogue on 
national reform programs12
Beneath the debate: 
old and new cleavages
• Supporters vs. opponents of social regulation
– Market liberals vs. social democrats
– Social welfare as a by-product of economic growth vs. social 
protection as a productive factor
• Supporters vs. opponents of Europeanization 
– ‘Federalists’ vs. ‘subsidiarists’
• Political will vs. experimental policy learning
– EU & MS already know what to do in terms of economic and 
social reforms, but have lacked political will to implement them
– Alternative view: ongoing experimentation and policy learning are 
needed to discover how best to pursue multi-dimensional 
objectives in diverse national contexts13
II. Where’s the Evidence?
• Kok Lisbon Strategy Report
– Unbalanced composition
• Dominated by economists and business figures
– Limited expertise on social/employment policies
– No systematic review of OMC processes
• Revised Lisbon Strategy/New Start
– Drafted primarily by DG Enterprise
– Appears to have ignored internal and external evidence 
on successes and failures of different OMC processes 14
Advancing the European knowledge 
economy through OMC: a failure?
• Weak performance of innovation/information society 
initiatives within Lisbon Strategy
– Lack of progress towards 3% R&D target
– Limited impact/visibility of eEurope policies
• ‘Lite’ OMC recipes and fragmentary architectures
– European Action Plans, objectives, targets, indicators, 
benchmarking/scoreboards
– But no agreed National Action Plans, systematic 
monitoring/reporting, peer review, or country-specific 
recommendations; weak mutual learning mechanisms
– External evaluation (Tavistock Institute 2005): 
OMC in these areas ‘cannot yet be said to be a success or failure’: 
‘simply has not been fully implemented’15
The OMC in action: 
employment and social inclusion
• Employment and social inclusion: most fully 
developed and institutionalized OMC processes
• Methodological problems of assessing the causal 
impact of an iterative policymaking process based 
on collaboration between EU institutions and MS 
without legally binding sanctions
• But now a large body of empirical research, based 
on both official and independent sources
• Synthetic overview in Zeitlin & Pochet (eds.), 
The OMC in Action (P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2005)16
OMC in employment and social 
inclusion: a qualified success
• Improvements in EU employment performance
– Structural improvements, 1997-2001
– But connections to EES complex and uncertain
• Substantive policy change
– Increased political salience/ambition of national 
employment and social inclusion policies 
– Broad shifts in national policy thinking 
– Some influence on specific reforms/programs
– Two-way interaction between OMCs and national 
policies rather than one-way impact17
OMC in employment/inclusion:
a qualified success (2)
• Procedural shifts in governance/policymaking
– Horizontal integration across policy areas
– Improved statistical and steering capacity
– Vertical coordination between levels of governance
• Participation of non-state/subnational actors
– Particularly strong mobilization in social inclusion 
– Uneven but growing participation in EES 
– Social NGOs and local/regional authorities more active 
than social partners18
OMC in employment and inclusion: 
a qualified success (3)
• Mutual learning
– Identification of common challenges and promising 
policy approaches 
– Enhanced awareness of policies, practices, and 
problems in other MS
– Statistical harmonization and capacity building
– MS stimulated to rethink own approaches/practices, 
as a result of comparisons with other countries and 
ongoing obligations to re-evaluate national performance 
against European objectives19
OMC in employment 
and inclusion: limitations
• Lack of openness and transparency
– Dominant role of bureaucratic actors in OMC processes 
at both EU and national level
• Weak integration into national policy making
– NAPs as reports to EU rather than operational plans
– Low public awareness and media coverage
• Little bottom-up/horizontal policy learning
– Few examples of upwards knowledge transfer and 
cross-national diffusion from innovative local practice20
A reflexive reform strategy
• Overcome limitations of existing OMC processes 
by applying method to its own procedures 
– Benchmarking, peer review, monitoring, evaluation, 
iterative redesign
• Ongoing reforms as evidence of practical viability
– Strengthening of peer review/mutual learning programs
– Proposals by EU institutions for greater openness, 
stakeholder participation, and ‘mainstreaming’ of 
OMCs into domestic policy making (2003-6)21
III. What’s Left of Lisbon 
and the OMC?
• Rebalancing the Lisbon Strategy
– Retreat by Barroso Commission from attempt to 
exclude social cohesion from revised Lisbon Strategy
– Successful EU-level campaign by social NGOs, with 
support from key MS and European Parliament
– Social objectives reinstated in Lisbon Strategy by 2005 
Spring European Council Presidency Conclusions
• Including commitment to decisive reduction of poverty & 
social exclusion
– Reaffirmed in 2006/2007 Spring European Council 
Conclusions22
Saving the social OMCs
• Social protection OMCs reaffirmed
– Inclusion, pensions, health care
• Three ‘strands’ streamlined into an integrated 
process with both common and specific objectives
• Social OMCs to ‘feed into’ new Lisbon Strategy
– Weak influence on NRPs, with some exceptions 
depending on national priorities
– Joint Report, key messages Æ Spring Euro Council 
• Continuing struggle with Barroso Commission priorities
– Monitoring Lisbon Strategy impact on social cohesion 
(‘feeding out’) – little evidence of this so far23
Integrating the economic and 
employment guidelines
• Bigger change on employment side, through 
integration of EEGs with BEPGs
• Main thrust of existing EEGs preserved, 
including linkage to overarching objectives
– But only at cost of maintaining complexity
• Continuing tensions between economic and 
employment actors within new integrated 
guidelines/coordination process24
Closing the implementation gap 
through better governance?
• Simplification of objectives & reporting?
• Increased national ownership & 
participation?
• From multilateral coordination to bilateral 
consultation? 
• Results of first two rounds of NRPs not 
encouraging25
Simplification or specificity?
– Difficulty of sustaining simplified focus
– Need for specificity and detail to coordinate 
complex policy areas effectively
– Interdependence between growth/jobs and other 
policy areas w/ separate coordination processes
• social protection/inclusion, education/training, 
environment/sustainable development
– Multiplication of new priorities, coordination 
processes & reporting obligations
• E.g. better regulation, immigrant integration26
Reduced monitoring and 
coordinating capacity
• MS free to set own priorities in NRPs
• National employment reporting less extensive and 
more uneven than in NAPs
• Diminished reference to guidelines, targets, and 
common indicators
• Commission assessment methodologies disputed 
between EPC and EMCO
• Selective peer review of NRPs
– Focused on 3 key themes in employment 
– Broader in macro/micro economic policies27
Decoupling mutual learning 
from policy making?
• Mutual learning activities stepped up within EU 
committees (EMCO, SPC)
– Peer review/exchange of good practices, thematic 
seminars, national follow-up activities
• Risk of decoupling mutual learning from national 
policy making: opposite of mainstreaming
– Perverse effects of recent French and German 
employment reforms as cautionary examples
• Risk to institutional capacity building and 
governance improvements at EU and MS levels28
Increased national ownership 
and participation (1)?
• Round 1 (2005)
– Limited ambition/novelty of many NRPs
• Repackaging of national policies very common
• Low status of Lisbon coordinators in many MS
– Low public and media visibility
– Little involvement of national parliaments
– Limited/variable involvement of social partners
– Little involvement of subnational & civil society actors
– A clear step backwards from NAPs/empl & incl in 
inclusion of civil society29
Increased national ownership 
and participation? (2)
• Big Commission push for greater national ownership in 2nd
round of NRP implementation (2006)
– Creation of new consultative/coordination bodies 
– Upgrading of political status of Lisbon coordinators
– Wider involvement of national parliaments, social partners, 
regional/local authorities
– Little opportunity for participation by social NGOs & other civil 
society groups
• But still low strategic commitment from non-state actors & 
limited public appeal of relaunched Lisbon Strategy
– Especially where social cohesion objectives are excluded from 
NRPs, and process is dominated by finance/economics ministries30
The return of recommendations: 
friendly advice or naming & shaming?
• Commission did not make formal recommendations to MS 
on 2005 NRPs
– Just flagged ‘points requiring further attention’
• 2006 Annual Progress Report includes country-specific 
recommendations
– MS progress in implementing revised Lisbon Strategy graded from 
“limited” to “very good”
– MS receive 0-5 recommendations,  + 3-5 additional ‘focus points’
• Lack of transparency/legitimacy in evaluation criteria
– Recommendations negotiated bilaterally with MS
– EMCO rejects peer review/multilateral surveillance of country-
specific employment recommendations31
Bilateral consultation or 
multilateral coordination?
• Difficulty of sustaining shift from multilateral coordination 
to bilateral consultation between Commission and MS
• Low quality/lack of comparability of many NRPs
• Continuing commitment of MS to comparing policy 
approaches/performance & mutual learning
• Commission plans for renewed mutual surveillance on 
‘horizontal’ issues 
– e.g. energy, research/innovation, flexicurity
• Mutual learning workshops within network of National 
Lisbon Coordinators on priority areas
– e.g. one-stop shops for setting up new enterprises, business-university 
cooperation, extending working lives of older workers32
Deficiencies of Lisbon II
• Inadequate integration of social, economic, 
and employment policies
• Decoupling of policy making from mutual 
learning
• Reduced monitoring and coordinating 
capacity
• Insufficient openness to civil society actors
• National commitment remains limited33
Reorienting the relaunch? 
Towards Lisbon III
• Mounting pressure to reorient the Lisbon Strategy
– ‘Un Nouvel Élan pour l’Europe Sociale’ declaration of 
9 MS Labor/Social ministers
– Social priorities of EU Team Presidency (DE/PT/SI)
– 2007 Spring European Council conclusions
– SPC debate on strengthening the social dimension of 
the Lisbon Strategy
– 10-year review of the EES (2007)
– 2008 revision of Integrated Guidelines